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ABSTRACT
Networks are traditionally configured manually by operators who can po-
tentially introduce misconfigurations, exposing the network to security risks.
Furthermore, as network complexity grows it becomes harder to track anoma-
lous activity in networks, especially for configuration changes which may go
unnoticed unless they have an immediate impact on network operation. Ex-
isting techniques for detecting anomalies rely on inspecting irregular patterns
in network traffic or configuration files. In this work, we present a prelim-
inary framework which utilizes network metadata for detecting anomalies
across enterprise networks.
Network metadata helps describe properties of a network that may not
be expressed by traffic data, and provides an additional metric to evaluate
the overall health of a network. Examples of network metadata include
software version and interface status for each device in a network. We perform
statistical analysis on a combination of network data plane and metadata
features in order to detect anomalies as close as possible to the network’s
actual behavior. Using a private enterprise dataset, we were able to analyze
network metadata to identify anomalous trends which may render a network
vulnerable to security threats.
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Modern enterprise networks are complex systems, incorporating thousands
of network devices from multiple vendors which perform diverse codependent
functions on a heterogeneous backbone. Maintaining a network at this scale
entails monitoring network events in the order of thousands on a monthly
basis [1]. In order to perform analysis on the source of such network events,
it is important to understand the two plane of operations responsible for
a network’s behaviour - the control plane and the data plane. The control
plane is responsible for determining information about how to reach destina-
tion IP addresses in a network. This is typically done by means of routing
algorithms (e.g., RIP, OSPF) or manual configuration by inserting low-level
commands through an individual network device’s command-line interface
(e.g., inserting BGP routes). The data plane relies on the state established
by the control plane to forward packets in a network and is embodied in a
forwarding table (Forwarding Information Base (FIB)). Forwarding in the
data-plane is also driven by internal tables that control access-control (e.g.,
ACL, VLAN tables)
However, from a security perspective, we recognize that auxiliary network
metadata features are also an important indicator of the overall health of an
enterprise network. Metadata in the context of networks include features that
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describe a network such as software version information, VLAN and interface
status for individual devices in a network. They may additionally describe
properties of tables internal to routing devices such as the size of a forwarding
table or the prefix lengths of entries contained in it. Network metadata helps
describe properties of a network that may not be expressed by inspection of
traffic flows or configuration files alone. Analysis of such network metadata
features provides an additional metric to evaluate the overall health of a
network. Together with data-plane features, this information can be used
to assess potential network vulnerabilities, such as susceptibility to network
attacks, configuration errors and violations of network-wide policies. For
example, a surge in the number of forwarding table entries may be linked to
deteriorating network performance. Tracking such network events would help
network operators manage their networks better. Existing techniques in the
domain of anomaly detection in large-scale networks rely either on inspection
of irregular patterns in network traffic flows [2], static and dynamic analysis
of configuration files [3][4] or applying verification methods on control plane
information [5]. In this work, we explore the potential of using a combination
of time-varying data plane and network metadata information as means of
identifying anomalous patterns in a large-scale network behavior to uncover
security risks.
To this end, we propose a framework which performs statistical analy-
sis on metadata from time-varying network snapshots to generate easy-to-
understand summaries of the network state. We designed a pipeline with de-
coupled components each of which performs a specialized task. The pipeline
takes a set of time-varying raw network ‘snapshots’ which encapsulate all
network features at a point in time. The raw snapshot passes through a
number of parsing phases which extract relevant metadata features for fur-
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ther analysis. These features are provided to the core anomaly detector
module which applies a series of statistical analysis techniques to them. In
addition to providing a number of custom statistical techniques, which we
term as ‘mechanisms’, we factored in extensibility in the anomaly detection
module so that techniques from third-party statistical software such as R [6]
could be performed on the data as well. The final output of the pipeline is a
series of network state summaries which can be investigated further by net-
work operators. The primary goal we want to address with our system is to
help identify and mitigate misconfigurations by detecting anomalous patterns
in enterprise networks. Moreover, we propose that analysis of time-varying
snapshots provides network operators a birds-eye view of the network, mak-
ing it easy to identify bottlenecks and network features that contribute to
growing network complexity. Such insight will allow our system to serve as
a source for diagnosing network performance degradation based on anoma-
lous patterns in identified network features. We summarize the contributions
made by this body of work in the rest of this section.
• Proposed the first framework that leverages metadata for network-
wide anomaly detection
Prior work has studied various network features either for formal network
verification or static analysis of configuration files. To the best of our
knowledge, our system is the first to utilize metadata information for var-
ious network features in order to study anomalous behavior in networks.
• Designed and implemented a prototype for our framework
We designed an implementation which is able to handle the collective for-
warding state for a large-scale enterprise network. We designed the overall
system to be a distributed, decentralized pipeline of specialized compo-
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nents. Extensibility is introduced in the overall architecture by allowing
techniques from third-party statistical software to be integrated in our
anomaly detector module.
• Evaluated our framework using a real-world data-set
We applied statistical analysis techniques to network metadata from a pri-
vate enterprise spanning three years to evaluate the efficacy of our frame-
work. As a result we discovered a number of anomalous patterns in in
various network features. We detail these findings in Section 4.2.
We motivate our approach by studying common complaints in network
management and present the case for more fine-grained monitoring of enter-
prise networks in the next section.
1.2 Motivation
Maintenance and configuration of enterprise networks is a difficult and error-
prone task [7]. According to a 2015 survey of network operators, up to 89%
of operators were unsure that any modifications made to configuration files
would not introduce new problems or bugs in the network, whereas 82% were
concerned that the changes would cause problems with existing functionality
unrelated to the change [8]. Moreover, ensuring smooth operation of enter-
prise networks entails frequent configuration changes. Legitimate reasons for
making network changes include policy management, infrastructure expan-
sion, patching firmware and traffic engineering. Without a complete view of
the network-wide impact that result from configuration changes, it is diffi-
cult for a network operator to ascertain the network state, verify the changes
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and pinpoint where to look for sources of potential bugs or security vulner-
abilities. This has resulted in a number of high-impact network outages and
security breaches including the AS7007 incident where human error led to a
major global Internet outage [9]
In this work, we make the case for fine-grained monitoring and statistical
analysis of network features that are often overlooked by existing research
tools. These include forwarding table sizes, software version information and
status information for physical interfaces, all of which are indicative of the
overall health of a network. We conducted a measurement study of a private
enterprise dataset to demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed framework.
Statistical analysis of network data-plane and metadata features provides
insight into areas of growing network complexity as well as revealing potential
security vulnerabilities.
Roadmap
We present a brief discussion on related works in the following chapter (Chap-
ter 2). We next present a design for our anomaly detection framework based
on time-varying snapshots (Section 3.1) with implementation details to follow
(Section 3.2). We then evaluate our system on a private enterprise dataset
(Chapter 4) and discuss the efficacy of our system in identifying anomalous
patterns (Section 4.2). We go on to study performance metrics of our system




Studying networks for anomalies has been an active area of research and
has helped establish a number of themes used for identifying and correcting
bugs in production networks. Network operators traditionally insert low-
level configuration commands to make changes to a network. These changes
are represented in the form of configuration files in network devices and have
been the central subject of numerous works on diagnosing network miscon-
figurations. A popular theme involves static analysis of configuration files.
Another theme focuses on applying formal methods to the configuration state
to verify network correctness. Other themes include using general anomaly
detection algorithms on Internet traffic or packet payloads. However, existing
work only focuses on a specific subset of network features, often excluding
network metadata which we argue can be valuable in monitoring overall net-
work health.
Static and dynamic analysis of network configurations
Prior work has applied static analysis techniques on configuration files be-
longing to various types of network devices. Feldmann et al. developed a
tool which uses static analysis to infer dependencies within and across config-
uration files from routing devices in order to identify misconfiguration errors
[10]. Static analysis is also performed for configuration files belonging to
routing devices in [11]. Work by Yuan et al. focuses on distributed firewall
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configurations to produce graph based rule structures which are analyzed for
access-control [12]. Symbolic model checking of firewall configurations is also
explored in [13]. Static analysis has also been used for better understanding
how individual network features are configured. One such work focuses on
the impact of access-control lists on network reachability [14]. Feamster et
al. developed rcc which focuses on verifying correctness of BGP configu-
rations by analyzing a normalized representation of the configuration state
[3]. Maltz et al. studied a number of enterprise network configurations in
order to better understand the design and use of network configuration in
enterprise networks [15].
There is little work in the domain of dynamic analysis of network con-
figuration. Existing work by Sung et al. performs longitudinal analysis to
configuration files across five enterprise VPN customers for brief periods [4].
Chen et al. model dependencies between configuration states by analyzing
changes from a Tier-1 ISP to enable automated network management [16].
Formal verification techniques
Analysis of configuration files has also been applied for purposes of formal
network verification, but these approaches usually fall short in their abil-
ity to measure the impact of misconfigured or buggy router configuration.
Kazemian et al. proposed a protocol-agnostic framework, which inspects
protocol header fields to check invariants such as reachability, forwarding
loops and traffic isolation [17][5]. Similarly, SymNet tracks the possible val-
ues for specified fields in the packet as it travels through a network [18].
ConfigChecker [19] and FlowChecker [20] convert network rules (configura-
tion and forwarding rules respectively) into boolean expressions in order to
check network invariants. Bjørner et al. propose ddNF, a new data structure
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for efficient network verification which is able to encode packet header spaces
in the form of ternary bit-vectors for small equivalence classes [21].
A revised approach to formal verification of networks focuses on the data
plane instead of the control plane as introduced in Anteater [22]. This work
was furthered in the form of Veriflow [23], which offers a real-time network-
wide invariants verification system. Real-time network verification is also
explored by Yang et al. [24] who use atomic predicates derived from packet
filters to substantially reduce the time taken for network verification. Fogel
et al. proposed a new approach to network configuration analysis which
uses a declarative model that is able to derive the actual data plane from
a given configuration file [25]. However, existing work leveraging network
verification does not offer a way to monitor and analyze the behavior of
individual network features across time, which we aim to address in this
work.
Generic anomaly detection in networks
Anomaly detection algorithms are usually applicable to only a specific use-
case, as categorized by Chandola et al. [26]. Although a wide variety of
techniques for detecting anomalies in networks already exist [27], prior work
focuses either on payload or traffic based intrusion detection [28][29][30].
Work done by Kim et al. leveraged rule-based heuristics to distinguish par-
ticular types of anomalies in sampled flow traffic [31]. Lakhina et al. used
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to separate normal and anomalous
network-wide traffic data [2]. To address scalability limitations in prior work
that used PCA [32][33], Huang et al. proposed an adaptive, distributed
framework which relies on stochastic matrix perturbation theory for network
anomaly detection [34]. The use of entropy to model traffic feature distribu-
8
tions with the goal of profiling IP traffic for anomaly detection has also been
explored in [35] and [36].
Work by Kohler et al. [37] focuses on inspecting network address correla-
tion properties in IP packet headers to detect anomalies. Authors of PAYL
[38] analyse byte-frequencies for profiling anomalous IP packets. This work
was furthered in [39] which utilizes higher order n-grams instead of single
byte frequencies for anomaly detection. Bolzoni et al. developed POSEI-
DON, an anomaly detection system which leverages a neural network that is
trained on data-field lengths of IP payloads for filtering network traffic [40].
Packet header inspection has also been explored in [41]. Laptev et al. utilize
forecasting models for scalable anomaly detection on generic time-series data
[42]. What differentiates our contributions from this body of work is that
we focus on network metadata as the primary source of analyzing network





Figure 3.1: Work-flow for a network snapshot through the framework pipeline
In this section we describe the workflow of our anomaly detection frame-
work with a brief description of the pipeline components. We designed each
pipeline component to be a decentralized entity as part of a larger distributed
framework. This decoupling ensures extensibility in the overall architecture,
allowing components to be hosted and maintained independently. As input,
the framework is designed to support time-varying raw network snapshots.
A network snapshot is defined as an entity which encompasses the entire
forwarding state of the network at a particular point in time (essentially
all network features for each device). With a snapshot containing both data
plane and device metadata information, it is the most detailed account of net-
work activity available. The overall workflow involves passing time-varying
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network snapshots through a parsing pipeline which prepares the relevant
features for statistical analysis to be used in the next stages. The anomaly
detector module applies a series of statistical analysis techniques and outputs
state summaries to the reporter module.
Design Challenges: Designing a system which handles the collective for-
warding state for a large-scale network presents its own set of challenges.
• Enterprise networks typically consist of routing devices belonging to dif-
ferent vendors - each with a slightly different representation of network
features. This creates difficulties in performing analysis for devices in a
heterogeneous network.
• Frequent snapshot collection can cause processing delays due to the large
volume of data entailed in a single snapshot for an enterprise network. This
requires maintaining a large state in memory and creates a bottleneck when
attempting to perform analysis for immediate results.
We designed our framework to address these key concerns. To tackle the
first challenge, we observed that most network devices share a common set
of core functionality across all vendors. Keeping this in mind, we designed
our framework to be extensible enough to facilitate any third-party collec-
tion and parsing system. For our implementation, we chose a third-party
parser [23] whose output is then transformed into a standardized vendor-
agnostic representation of most network features (e.g., forwarding tables,
access-control lists) by our preprocessor component. Secondly, to handle
scalability concerns we decided to maintain minimal state using a streaming
architecture which presented in Figure 3.1. This allows our framework to
consume network snapshots as soon as they are collected, and pass on state
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for at most two snapshots to each pipeline component. As a preliminary
design to demonstrate the efficacy of our system, we wrote an implementa-
tion for a system that consumes a discrete collection of snapshots as a single
input.
The core components of our analysis framework are highlighted in Fig-
ure 3.1. Component-specific details and a list of applied statistical analysis
techniques are presented in the next sections.
3.1.1 Collector
The collector is a logically centralized component whose job is to periodi-
cally issue ‘show commands’ to the command-line interface for each device
contained in the network. Each show command queries a particular network
data-plane or metadata feature from the device, and this information is fi-
nally aggregated into a raw network snapshot by the collector. For the scope
of this work, we do not provide details about collection of raw data as it’s
implementation can vary across different types of networks.
3.1.2 Parsing Pipeline
Parser
Raw data collected from all devices in the network is first passed to a parser
module. The parser module generates a standardized device model (DM )
representation for each network feature of a routing device in the network.
This representation is then aggregated into a single data model object per
device to be used by the next component in our framework. To allow exten-
sibility in our design, we allow any third-party parser to be plugged into our
framework. Internal details of a typical parser component is not covered as
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part of this work.
Pre-Processor
The device model object produced by the parser is passed to a preprocessor
module which is responsible for extracting relevant features and preparing an
intermediary representation (I.R) to be used for analysis by the anomaly
detector. This intermediary representation can be filtered based on the type
of analysis that is being performed. The component allows tracking changes
in selected properties for each network feature. As an example, suppose a
network operator wants to track the size of a forwarding table for each device
in a network across time. This is specified to the preprocessor component
via a tuple containing a network feature and it’s specified property. In




where ‘forwarding table’ is the network feature and the property be-
ing tracked is ‘size’ (i.e., the number of entries in the forwarding table).
Additional properties provided include a ‘content’ property which enables
content-based comparison of the actual network feature. This would allow
a network operator to track the differences in forwarding table entries as
per our earlier example. As a final output, the I.R component appends the
feature vector with the device ID before analysis can be performed on it.
3.1.3 Anomaly Detector
The intermediary representation generated in the last stage is passed on to a
centralized anomaly detection module. This module forms a core component
of our framework and is responsible for analyzing how statistical properties
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of the different data-plane and metadata features evolve over time. Perform-
ing anomaly detection with respect to an established threshold is a difficult
task as network feature values may fluctuate as per seasonal changes (with
periods of high and low network activity). Moreover, automated threshold
determination itself is a non-trivial challenge as it requires a priori labelled
examples of what constitutes an anomaly. For the scope of this work, we
define anomalous behaviour in networks as any observable deviations in the
values of a chosen network feature, for e.g., the sudden addition or removal of
20 Access-Control List (ACL) entries overnight might be flagged for review
by a network operator.
Statistical Mechanisms
The anomaly detection module encompasses a variety of statistical tech-
niques, which we term as ‘mechanisms’, to be performed on the intermedi-
ate representation received from the preprocessor module. Our preliminary
design supports statistical properties such as tracking the maximum, mini-
mum or average values for network features given a corpus of time-varying
snapshots. We group such statistical operations into a single ‘basic statis-
tics mechanism’ , which maintains state to track these properties for indi-
vidual devices in a network snapshot.
Additionally, we designed a ‘diff mechanism’ which allows order-sensitive
content comparison for network data plane and metadata components (e.g.,
access control lists and software version) across time. For network features
with ordering properties such as access-control lists, we based our mecha-
nism on a variant of the longest common sub-sequence algorithm proposed
by Myers [43] which uses edit graph formalism [44]. Our proposed mecha-
nism is generic enough to be applied to various network features including
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comparison of time-varying forwarding table entries.
Integration of External Libraries
The extensible design of this core module allows integration of various statis-
tical models into our analysis framework. This can be achieved by integrating
external libraries with our framework. For instance, our analysis module can
be interfaced with the popular statistical software R [6], which provides a
wide variety of statistical modeling techniques (e.g., regression modeling,
classical statistical tests). This provides the added benefit of easily testing
and applying a wide variety of techniques which are already provided by
libraries in R before they can be natively ported to our system (which is
implemented in C++).
3.1.4 Reporter
The final component in the pipeline of our framework is a reporter which
summarizes the analysis performed by the Anomaly Detector module and
generates a series of graphs and reports for analysis by a network operator.
These results present a bird’s-eye view of the overall network state and allows
a network operator to track changes in various network features across time.
3.2 Implementation
We built a prototype implementation of the framework in C++ which takes
as input a corpus of time-varying network snapshots. The prototype imple-
mentation consists of ∼1800 lines of code. The main goals of the prototype
were to provide efficient performance and extensibility. To this end, we chose
to implement the system using C++ for which open-source plugins exist for
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popular statistical software including R and STATA [45]. We emphasized ef-
ficient performance by maintaining state for at most two network snapshots





We based the evaluation of our system on a private data-set belonging to
a major enterprise network. The data-set spanned three years (2014-2016)
worth of network snapshots with each snapshot consisting of nearly 200 - 400
routing devices belonging to a number of different vendors. We anonymize
any identifying information including device names, vendors and software
versions. We configured our prototype system to take the entire collection of
network snapshots as input. The data-set serves to evaluate the efficacy of
our analysis framework. As output, the system produces summaries of the
overall network state which can be used to investigate anomalous network
trends.
We designed a custom mechanism that would allow us to generate diff
summaries and plot trends for all network features available in a snapshot.
Any missing lines in the plots in Section 4.2 are due to unavailability of
data. Notable trends across selected network features are summarized in the
sections ahead.
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4.2 Analyzed Network Features
We chose to monitor a set of network data-plane and metadata features which
would be helpful for network operators to get a comprehensive view of the
changes made across a network. Analyzing time-varying plots for some of
these features revealed anomalous trends exhibited by a subset of the devices
in the network. Due to the large number of devices contained in the enterprise
network, we include the network feature trends for the complete network in
Appendix A where applicable.
4.2.1 Forwarding Table
The forwarding table is an important data-plane feature which encapsulates
all active routes to a specific network destination. When a packet arrives at a
routing device, the forwarding table is consulted to determine which interface
the packet should be delivered to en route its final destination. Monitoring
various metadata properties of this network feature provides unique insights
into the overall state of the network.
Forwarding Table Size
The overall trend for forwarding table size for the entire network is shown in
Figure A.1. Due to the large number of devices deployed in the network, we
highlight devices exhibiting anomalous behaviour in Figure 4.1.
Observation #1: Device 1 and Device 2 are both distinguished by an a
large spike in the number of forward table entries around the period August
2015 (peaking to around 36,000 entries). The table sizes for both devices
eventually fall to very low values near May 2016 before they are deactivated.
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Figure 4.1: Anomalous trends in forwarding table size
Observation #2: Device 3 exhibits inconsistent behaviour as it features
varying periods with a high number of forwarding table entries (around
10,000 entries).
Comments: The large spike in number of entries for both Device 1 and
Device 2 does not appear to be seasonal as the trend is not reflected in
either 2014 or 2016. A spike of such magnitude can adversely impact the
performance of routing devices as it may result in additional CPU load and
cache overflow. Such a pattern could also be indicative of a targeted security
attack on a network e.g., a spam or targeted CAM Table overflow attack.
Our framework can assist network operators to identify and mitigate such
attacks before they can adversely impact a network.
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Figure 4.2: Prefix length for all forwarding entries in a network snapshot
Prefix Length
Routing devices rely on the longest prefix match algorithm to select entries
from a forwarding table. Entries in a forwarding table may specify different
sub-networks by having different prefix lengths (also known as subnet masks).
A destination address matches the most specific forwarding table entry (i.e.,
the one with the longest matching prefix). Figure 4.2 tracks how the prefix
lengths for all forwarding table entries contained in a network snapshot vary
with time.
Observation: There is a large increase in the number of /32 length prefixes
around May 2015. The surge seems to correspond with the spike in number
of forwarding table entries (March 2015 to August 2015) which is indicative
of anomalous behaviour.
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Comments: The type of perturbations in 32 bit prefix lengths exhibited in
the network may degrade overall network performance. A large number of 32
bit length forwarding entries may slow down the longest-prefix match resolu-
tion and even cause faster eviction for cached routes in core routing devices.
Such variation may also suggest security lapses such as IP route leaks, which
operators can verify by corroborating with BGP route information for the
network.
Software Rollbacks
Observation: We found a small number of instances where devices were
being upgraded to newer software versions for a single day before being rolled
back to the earlier version.
Comments: Possible reasons for downgrading to earlier software versions
include conflicts or compatibility problems with neighboring devices. It may
also indicate that a device was upgraded to an incorrect software version or
that the upgrade was made in error. Our framework allows network operators
to be alerted about such inconsistencies.
4.2.2 Active Interfaces
Number of Active Interfaces
We tracked how the number of active physical interfaces for each device in the
network varied with time. The complete trend for all devices is presented in
Figure A.2. We highlight devices exhibiting anomalous behaviour in Figure
4.3.
Observation: We observed that a large majority of devices shared a similar
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Figure 4.3: Anomalous trends in number of active interfaces
trend, with a typical device consisting of less than 100 active interfaces. How-
ever, Device 1 and Device 5 demonstrated unusual patterns as they main-
tained a much larger number of active interfaces (close to 140 interfaces).
Device 1 in particular exhibits anomalous behaviour as its number of inter-
faces reaches a peak value around July 2015 before abruptly falling in the
subsequent month.
Comments: The behaviour exhibited by Device 1 may be indicative of a
misconfiguration. It may also suggest that there are a number of flapping in-
terfaces on the device - which is traditionally caused by hardware faults. Our
framework is able to reveal such irregular patterns for further investigation
by a network operator.
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4.2.3 Access-Control Lists
Access-control lists filter network traffic to restrict data flows into and out of
a network. This network feature provides an important layer of security and
is configured on a per-device basis. Access-control lists were only configured
on a limited number of devices in our private data-set.
Number of ACL Entries
We tracked how the size of access-control lists for each device in the network
varied with time. The complete trend for all devices is presented in Figure
A.3. We highlight devices exhibiting anomalous behaviour in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Anomalous trends in number of ACL entries
Observation: We observed three separate occasions (Jan - Feb 2015) when
the number of ACL entries dropped down to zero for Device 1. We also noted
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that Device 4 had an unusually high number of ACL entries, and there was
an insertion of nearly 15 more entries around July 2016.
Comments: Changes in access-control lists can be attributed to a number
of reasons including changes in policy, new customer requirements or decom-
missioning of prior devices. The security critical nature of access-control lists
requires network operators to pay close attention to each rule that is modified
as it may impact the overall network connectivity. This is emphasized by the
behaviour of Device 1 which removes all ACL rules for brief periods. Our
framework allows a network operator to inspect the changes made in ACL
entry for each device and provides more fine-grained control on the network.
Content of ACL Entries
We monitored if there were any significant changes to the content of access-
control lists for all devices across time. We used a customized diff mechanism
which allows comparison of ACL rules.
Observation: We observed that a majority of access-lists remain fairly sta-
ble with very few insertions and deletions of new rules. We summarise some
irregular findings which resulted from applying the diff mechanism to the
ACLs ahead. IP addresses and device names have been anonymized
• A new access-control list with identical entries was created for 12 dif-
ferent network devices in early Feb 2015.
• A single permit rule from the same access-control list was deleted on
10 of the 12 devices around July 2015.
Comments: The ACL rule that was deleted from multiple devices was
tied to a specific source IP address. It is difficult to distinguish if it was a
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legitimate change or a malicious one. These findings indicate that changes
could happen in batches across different devices. We posit that such changes
may go unnoticed in a network with a large number of devices, and thus





To study the performance of our system under heavy load, we ran the three-
year dataset containing raw snapshots from a private enterprise network
through our system implementation. The data-set consisted of 927 raw net-
work snapshots totalling to 211.7 GB of disk space. The specifications for
the system we ran performance tests on were as follows: Core i7-6700 CPU
with 8 cores @ 3.40GHz, 32 GB of DDR4 memory, 6 TB hard-drive running
at 7400 RPM.
In the rest of this section, we present performance benchmarks for the
various processing phases of our proposed system.
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5.2 Results
Measuring parsing and anomaly detection performance
(a) Total processing time per snapshot
(b) Parsing phase CDF (c) Mechanism processing times CDF
Figure 5.1: Processing time for parsing and mechanism phases
Figure 5.1 (a) presents the total processing times taken by each snapshot
object as a function of snapshot size. The remaining sub figures provide
CDFs for the two main processing phases of our system. Figure 5.1 (b) shows
time taken by the parsing phase which is responsible for extracting relevant
features from a vendor-agnostic network device in our system. Figure 5.1
(c) presents the time taken by the two broad types of ’mechanism’ functions
that form a core part of our anomaly detector component.
We expected parsing time to be much greater than the time taken by the
anomaly detection mechanisms as it involves reading a large number of files
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from disk.
Measuring performance of individual mechanism functions
(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: Processing time for size-based mechanisms
We measured the breakdown of how individual size-based mechanisms con-
tributed towards the total time taken to process a snapshot. We implemented
five size-based anomaly detection mechanisms, as depicted in Figure 5.2. We
observed that the time taken to process prefix-length frequency was an order
of magnitude greater than all other mechanisms (as shown in Figure 5.2b)
which can be explained by the extra work done to aggregate prefix length for
each forwarding table entry and mapping them to an internal data-structure.
Figure 5.3: Processing time for diff-based mechanisms
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We also measured the breakdown of how each individual diff-based mech-
anism contributed to the time taken to process diffs for anomaly detection.
We found that diffs between software version information make up a sig-
nificant portion of the total diff mechanism processing time. However, the
distribution may be skewed due to a disproportionately low volume of access
control list data in our private data-set as compared to the software version
information available, leading to lesser time being spent processing access
control lists overall.
Measuring how the performance of individual mechanism varies
with workload
(a) Forwarding Table (b) Prefix Length Frequency
(c) Active Interfaces (d) Access-control Lists
Figure 5.4: Performance for processing individual network features
Figure 5.4 measures the performance of individual mechanism phases as
a function of their respective workloads. We observed that processing time
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for mechanisms which perform analysis on forwarding tables (Figures 5.4a
and 5.4b) scale linearly with number of forwarding table entries. One unusual
result that we found was that processing time for the mechanism which tracks
the size of access-control lists (Figure 5.4d) experiences minimal growth even
with a increasing number of access-control list entries.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusion
Enterprise networks can evolve due a variety of reasons including policy man-
agement, traffic engineering or infrastructure expansion. However, the sheer
volume of such changes make it difficult to closely monitor the impact an
individual change has on the operational state of a network, or to identify
problem areas in specific configuration functionality. This can result in se-
curity lapses or even network performance degradation in many cases. In
contrast to earlier work which mainly focused on detecting irregular traffic
activity or analyzing router congurations, we chose to study changes in net-
work metadata. Metadata describes properties of individual network features
such as changes in the size of access-control lists, which reveal significant in-
formation about a networks overall health. In this work, we proposed an
anomaly detection framework which relies on network metadata to allow
fine-grained monitoring of a large-scale enterprise network.
We measured our framework’s efficacy and performance by using data from
a real enterprise network and found a number of anomalous patterns in vari-
ous network features. Highlighted anomalous behaviour can be corroborated
with network operators to help diagnose the source of the behaviour. The
performance evaluation showed that our implementation could scale well
with a large enterprise network with most anomaly detection mechanisms
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taking sub-second processing times. We argue that fine-grained tracking of
time-varying data-plane features helps discover potential misconfigurations
or anomalous patterns that network operators may not be aware of or may
overlook due to the sheer volume of changes in a network. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to utilize network metadata in anomaly de-
tection for enterprise networks. As the size of networks continue to grow, we
hope that our work can enable network operators to better identify areas of
growing network complexity and even bottlenecks in their networks to ensure
smooth operation of the network is not disrupted.
6.2 Future Work
Improvements can be made to the existing framework on multiple fronts.
Pertinent milestones include performing correlation analysis on multiple net-
work features to study whether certain properties frequently change together,
extending the existing library of mechanisms to study a greater number of
network features for anomalous patterns and making performance improve-
ments to the parsing phase which is our current bottleneck. Possible combi-
nation with existing network verification systems such as Veriflow [23] may
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